• Desde Maryland, USA, el estado de Maryland, fue uno de los primeros en usar este sistema; tuvieron problemas, pero siguieron adelante y planean utilizarlo en las próximas elecciones; tienen una pagina web dedicada a dar información

  • Algunos de los Problemas planteados

  • Sobre la maquina, es la Olivetti MAEL 205, usado para loterias. Las modificaron: solo pantalla, nada teclado. La maquinai

  • Olivetti Tecnost wins order for 20,000 electronic voting terminals in Venezuela.

  • Smartmatic las modifica, no se si le incluye el software (creo que acá está el valor agregado) y le coloca una nueva etiqueta a la maquina: modelo era SAES 3000, y SAES significa: Smartmatic Automated Elections Systems

  • REV On Line fue informada que Bizta, del consorcio SBC (Smartmatic, Bitza, Cantv), reconoce la necesidad de un proceso electoral muy transparente en Venezuela, y debido a lo recientemente publicado en El Herald de Miami, ha decidido cancelar el crédito que tiene con Foncrei el 10 de Junio de 2004. Según fuentes allegadas a SBC, se trata de una estructura de crédito, con garantía de acciones, al punto que hay una obligación de recompra por el monto del principal mas intereses; ell rol de estado es totalmente pasivo. El Herald publicó que una empresa del consorcio de automatización tiene una "participación" de un ente del Estado, lo que hace ver a SBC muy mal considerando que se trata de un contrato electoral aprobado por el rector del CNE, Jorge Rodríguez.

  •  BY DR. REBECCA MERCURI  (her home page, phone numbers etc) Vince, Vern and others,

    The MAIN reason why there are no documented cases of voter fraud (yet) using computers is because there is no availability of INDEPENDENT inspection of voting systems by experts (even when cases have gone to court) because the vendors are allowed to protect their products under restrictive trade secret agreements making it costly, time consuming, and unlikely to obtain a court order to look at the evidence. It is much akin to having a murder trial and prohibiting the plaintiffs from getting an autopsy or even reviewing the autopsy REPORT.
    Last year we attempted to get Palm Beach County to just "wind" a single impounded voting system back to where it was at the start of election day so that we could cast votes on it to see if it had malfunctioned or was programmed incorrectly. The plaintiff was willing to pay for the machine (though we had no intention of "breaking it with our screwdrivers" as the County attorney asserted in court). The response was basically "no, sorry, you can't do that, it's a secret." We also presented a 2-page list of materials that were supposed to have been archived for the voting system by the State of Florida and Palm Beach County according to the Florida State Election Law.
    We received ZERO of these materials (so why bother having laws that say such should be archived if nobody is going to get to see them) and the response was again "no, sorry, you can't review these, it's a secret." It would certainly have been possible to sign a non-disclosure agreement for the materials, but we weren't even allowed to do that. If there is voter fraud going on, the States, Counties, Courts, and vendors have made sure that nobody is going to find the evidence. But the fact that it's a secret, though, is not a secret.
    Here's a reply that a colleague recently received to a letter of inquiry regarding the security of voting systems being deployed in Fairfax County VA, where he lives (and works, as a computer security expert) and also votes: "Your many detailed questions generally pertain to the security systems used to protect the machines and the software used by those machines. While we appreciate that interest, to the extent that the County has any information that may be responsive to your request, I am advised to decline to provide it since such information is protected form disclosure by Virginia Code 2.2-3705(A)(18) and 2.2-4342(F) because of its proprietary nature and/or because nondisclosure of this information is permitted by Virginia Code 2.2-3705(A)(25),(45) and (69) and for the reason that release of that information could jeopardize the security of that voting equipment. " Hey, it's certified! Guess what, you can't check it out, see it says so
    right here in our laws! If you have a problem go away, you're a Sore Loserman! Is this any way to run a Democracy? Maybe in Cuba, or Iraq. Sorry, it's a secret, Rebecca Mercuri.
    Here is Dr. Mercuri's webpage about E-voting

  • This is the link to the IEEE engineers group and you will see a long thread of conversation about E-Voting and their arguments about the risks.  What is  best about this is taht it is a resource for the emails and names of the most respected Electrical Engineers in the USA.  I have already made contact with a man named Vincent Lipsio, and we've talked about this in depth.

  • Federal Certification Standards

  • About Voting machines:
    California Department of State information:

  • The status of Florida's congressfolk regarding HR 2239 is at:

  • A few good, general links:

  • Here is a selection from this blackboxvoting site:
    In the Alabama 2002 general election, machines made by Election Systems and Software (ES&S) flipped the governor's race. Six thousand three hundred Baldwin County electronic votes mysteriously disappeared after polls had closed and everyone had gone home.
    ...When I began researching this story in October 2002, the media was reporting that electronic voting machines are fun and speedy, but I looked in vain for articles reporting that they are accurate. I discovered four magic words, "voting machines and glitch," which, when entered into the 2 search engine, yielded a shocking result: A staggering pile of miscounts was accumulating.

    Read this next selection and think, "How could this effect any future referendum?"
    ...Voting machines failed to tally "yes" votes on the 2002 school bond issue in Gretna, Nebraska. This error gave the false impression that the measure had failed miserably, but it actually passed by a 2 to 1 margin. An Orange County, California, election computer made a 100 percent error during the April 1998 school bond referendum. The Registrar of Voters Office initially announced that the bond issue had lost by a wide margin; in fact, it was supported by a majority of the ballots cast. The error was attributed to a programmer's reversing the "yes" and "no" answers in the software used to count the votes. 6 In the November 2002 general election in Scurry County, Texas, poll workers got suspicious about a landslide victory for two Republican commissioner candidates. Told that a "bad chip" was to blame, they had a new computer chip flown in and also counted the votes by hand - and found out that Democrats actually had won by wide margins, overturning the election. 10 According to The Wall Street Journal, in the 2000 general election an optical-scan machine in Allamakee County, Iowa, was fed 300 ballots and reported 4 million votes. The county auditor tried the machine again but got the same result. Eventually, the machine's manufacturer, ES&S, agreed to have replacement equipment sent. Republicans had hoped that the tiny but heavily Republican county would tip the scales in George W. Bush's favor, but tipping it by almost four million votes attracted national attention. "We don't have four million voters in the state of Iowa," said Bill Roe Jr., county auditor.

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